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1. Introduction 
ENEL was often bracketed with other large nationalised European electric utilities such as Electricité de 
France (EDF), the Central Electricity Generating Board (UK), Public Power Company (Greece) and 
Electricidade de Portugal. However, each of these companies had its own particular specificities and, for 
example, there were important differences between it and EDF. It was founded in 1962, much later than EDF 
(1947), and, unlike EDF, it never had a near total monopoly of generation and much of its power was 
distributed through municipal companies. Perhaps most important, it was never seen as such an integral tool 
of government policy as EDF. While the French government has done no more than the minimum required 
by the European Union Energy Directives to break up EDF and reduce its market power, the Italian 
government has been pro-active in breaking up the company and breaking its market power. 
2. Government break-up policies: 1999-2006 
ENEL was fully state-owned until 1999 when 32 per cent of the shares were sold. A series of further sales 
left the Italian government with only 31.2% of the shares, 21.1% directly and 10.1% through the state-run 
lender, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Under the so-called ‘Bersani Decree’ ENEL had to be broken up into 
separate units for generation, transmission, distribution and sales to ‘eligible’ customers. ENEL was also 
required to reduce its generating capacity by selling about 15,000 MW by the end of 2002, a target that was 
not met till 2005. 
2.1. Generation 
The government required ENEL to sell of 15,000MW of its generating capacity in three packages. The 
government placed limits on the extent to which municipal utilities could own this capacity, so that publicly 
owned companies could only take a minority stake. The first, Elettrogen, with 5418MW, was sold in July 
2001 to a consortium led by the Spanish utility Endesa (45 per cent) that included AEM Brescia (15 per 
cent), the municipal utility, with the balance being held by the largest Spanish bank, Santander Central 
Hispano. Subsequently, Endesa raised its stake to a controlling 51 per cent, buying 5.7 per cent of the shares 
from the Spanish bank and changed the name to Endesa Italia. 
A second tranche of 7008MW, known as Eurogen, was sold to a consortium, Edipower, dominated by 
Edison (Italy) and EDF (France) in March 2002. The consortium was a complex one. Edison had the largest 
share with 40 per cent. Other members were AEM Milano (13.4 per cent), AEM Torino (13.3 per cent), the 
Swiss utility Atel (13.3 per cent), Unicredit (10 per cent), Royal Bank of Scotland (5 per cent) and Interbanca 
(5 per cent). Under the consortium agreement, the banking partners will not have rights to the capacity. 
Therefore, Edison will get direct control of 3,500MW, while the Milano and Torino groups and Atel (in 
which EDF holds 20 per cent) will gain control of another 1,150MW each. Edison, then the second largest 
generator in Italy with a controlling interest in over 10,000MW of capacity had been acquired in 2001 by 
Italenergia Bis (IEB), a partnership of Fiat (38.6 per cent) and EDF (18 per cent) although EDF had an 
option that seemed to require it to buy the outstanding 82 pct it did not own. However, the Italian 
government invoked the reciprocity clause of the 1996 Electricity Directive to limit EDF’s voting rights in 
Edison to 2 per cent. EDF already supplies about 15 per cent of Italy’s power through imports but the Italian 
government claimed the French market was effectively closed to foreign companies. EDF attempted to 
remove these restrictions on its voting rights but in April 2005 IEB was subject to a number of takeover 
offers. Endesa offered to buy 100 per cent of the shares in IEB in a deal that would also see its municipal 
partner ASM Brescia taking 20 per cent of Edison. AEM offered to buy a 40 per cent stake in Italenergia 
with the expectation that other municipal companies would take further stakes, notably Enia, the new 
municipal resulting from the merger of TESA from Piacenza, AMPS from Parma and AGAC from Reggio 
Emilia. 
In April 2005, EDF and ENEL signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which ENEL would be able 
to buy electricity from EDF and re-sell it on the French market. ENEL was seeking to obtain a 35 per cent 
stake in the French energy group SNET, the use of EDF power plants, the takeover of distribution networks 
in France, the purchase of power generation plants EDF is selling abroad and participation in the 
commercialisation of the EPR (European Pressurised water Reactors) nuclear power plant. This agreement 
was designed to allow the Italian government to lift the restrictions on EDF’s voting rights in Edison. 
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In May 2005, EDF and AEM Milano announced an agreement to take over Edison. EDF would end up with 
50 per cent of Edison, while AEM and any future partners are expected to hold up to 40 per cent. The 
balance will remain quoted. This agreement was contingent on the Italian government lifting the restriction 
on EDF’s voting rights. 
The final tranche, Interpower, comprising 2611MW of plant was sold in November 2002. Ownership of the 
new company was split equally between Energia Italia and a consortium of Electrabel and ACEA. The main 
shareholder in Energia Italia is the de Benedetti family’s Cir holding. Energia Italia is 62 per cent controlled 
by Energia, which in turn is 74 per cent controlled by Cir with the largest Austrian electricity company, the 
Verbund, holding the balance. The municipal companies based in Genoa (Amga SpA) and in Bologna (Hera 
SpA) own much of the 38 per cent balance of Energia Italia. The Electrabel ACEA joint venture is 70 per 
cent owned by Electrabel and 30 per cent by ACEA, but for the purchase of Interpower, the ownership will 
be split 50-50. 
2.2. Transmission 
Operation of the transmission sector was separated off as Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale 
(GRTN) a public body controlled by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance. In 2005, GRTN 
changed its name to Gestore del Sistema Elettrico (GRTN SpA). The new company was owned by the Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. At the same time, GRTN's electricity dispatching, transmission and grid 
development assets were transferred to TERNA. 
Ownership of the transmission assets was through TERNA, then partly still owned by ENEL. ENEL was 
required to reduce its holding in TERNA to no more than 20 per cent by July 1, 2007 and it began selling 
shares in June 2004. As of 2005, ENEL only held 5 percent of the shares of TERNA and it expects to sell 
this stake in April 2009. 
2.3. Distribution 
Significant changes were also required to the distribution sector. In any municipality, only one distribution 
company would be licensed. Previously, most Italian cities were served by a local independent distribution 
company and by a company controlled by ENEL. All non-ENEL distribution companies serving more than 
300,000 end users were given 180 days to create joint stock companies into which the distribution assets 
would be transferred. In cities where a non-ENEL distributor served more than 20 per cent of consumers, 
ENEL was required to transfer its distribution assets and personnel by March 31, 2001 
Several of the municipal companies began then to convert to public companies. However, in all the 
municipal companies, the public still has a majority stake. For foreign companies attempting to enter the 
Italian market, a collaboration of some sort with a municipal company was very attractive, offering access to 
final consumers. 
3. Diversification 
In the past decade, ENEL has tried to diversify out of energy into a number of new sectors. Its first major 
venture was the Wind telecoms company, launched in 1997, in which ENEL held 51% and the remaining 
49% was held by Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom. Subsequently, ENEL took over Deutsche 
Telekom’s and France Telecom’s stakes and from July 2003, ENEL owned all the shares until it sold 62.75% 
of them in May 2005 to Weather Investments, a company owned by an Egyptian entrepreneur, Naguib 
Sawiris in return for a stake in 26% stake in Weather. An option for Weather to buy the remaining 37.75% of 
the shares was exercisable from 2006. 
It launched a range of other companies. The 20011 and 20022 Annual Reports noted activities in: Information 
technology and e-business; real estate and services; engineering and contracting; public and art lighting; and 
water. Most of these activities were however closely related to the core activities in energy. In the 2003 
Annual Report, the Chief Executive Officer, Paolo Scaroni told shareholders3: 
‘ENEL today is a very different company from what it was two years ago. Management is now entirely focused on 
our core business of electricity and gas.’ 
In its 2004 report, it reported the intention to divest its shares in TERNA and Wind.4 
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4. International expansion 
Despite the income ENEL received from divesting some of its network and generation assets, ENEL was 
slow to start to expand internationally. The other major European electric utilities, such as EDF, RWE and 
E.ON had, by 2005 already expanding, for example into UK and some of the more prosperous Eastern 
European countries such as Czech Republic and Hungary. Up to 2006, ENEL’s main acquisitions were:5 
• the Spanish utility, Viesgo, bought from Endesa in 2001; 
• control of Bulgaria’s largest power plant, Maritza East III (840MW, lignite), 2003; 
• control (66 per cent) of Slovenske Elektrarne (SE), the largest electricity generator in Slovakia, 
2005; 
• control (51 per cent) of Electrica Banat and Electrica Dobrogea, electricity distributors in Romania 
with 1.4 m customers; 
• operation in partnership with the local private group ESN Energo of the North-West Thermal Power 
Plant in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 2004. 
However, its first major attempted acquisition was signalled in February 2006, when it acknowledged it 
wanted to buy the French-owned company, Suez, in particular its electricity division Electrabel, which holds 
a dominant position in Belgium. This quickly led to an acrimonious dispute between the French and Italian 
governments.6 The bid was quickly pre-empted by an agreement between Suez and Gaz de France (GDF) to 
merge but it was not till October of 2006 that ENEL acknowledged defeat. 
At the same time as this was taking place, an equally prolonged and controversial attempt was underway for 
the German utility, E.ON, to take over the largest Spanish utility, Endesa. This had been subject to a takeover 
bid by the Spanish gas company, Gas Natural, but in February 2006, E.ON outbid them with a cash offer 
worth €29.1bn. By January 2007, E.ON had raised its bid twice, to €41bn, most regulatory hurdles appeared 
to have been cleared and Gas Natural had withdrawn its offer. However, by March 2007, the takeover was in 
doubt, with ENEL, the Italian company, taking a rival position in the company and potentially blocking 
majority control. E.ON agreed to withdraw its bid and received compensation of its costs from ENEL. It also 
took a package of assets valued at €11.5bn from ENEL/Endesa in France, Italy and Spain. These included: 
Endesa Italia, the fourth largest generation company in Italy with 7.2GW; 65% of Endesa/SNET France, 
which owns 2.5GW of generation (the third largest French generator); and ENELViesgo and other Spanish 
assets (2.5GW plus 580,000 customers). 
In October 2007, ENEL and Acciona, a Spanish engineering company, completed the takeover of Endesa for 
€43bn, Spain’s largest utility. ENEL (67%) and Acciona (25%) hold 92% of Endesa’s shares. Endesa’s main 
assets outside Spain are in Latin America, where it owns 14,317MW of generating capacity.  
Under the terms of the Endesa takeover, Acciona had the option (a ‘put’ option) to sell its stake any time 
between 27 March 2010 and 26 March 2016. Selling its stake would allow Acciona to reduce its debts of 
over €17bn but would increase ENEL’s debts. In February 2009, ENEL agreed to buy Acciona’s stake in 
Endesa for €11.1bn. The deal included the transfer of €2.9bn of Endesa's renewable energy assets to 
Acciona. Acciona will receive €9.6bn from ENEL, with the remaining €1.5bn being paid through an early 
dividend by Endesa. The details of how ENEL will finance this deal are examined below.7 
The acquisition of Endesa placed ENEL squarely amongst the five largest utilities in Europe (EDF, E.ON, 
RWE and GDF Suez are the other four). How these five companies rank against each other depends on the 
measure – installed capacity, energy sold, turnover – but these five companies are now much more than 
double the size of their nearest competitors and the gap between them and their smaller competitors seems to 
be growing. All have made major acquisitions in the past two years – EDF has taken over British Energy, 
E.ON has acquired assets from ENEL, Suez and GDF have merged, RWE has taken over Essent. So from 
that point of view, ENEL’s acquisition of Endesa seems to place it amongst an elite group of companies with 
such huge market power that their profitable future seems guaranteed. Its 2008 results stated: ‘international 
expansion complete’.8 
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5. ENEL’s position 
5.1. Financial position 
Table 1 ENEL results – 2004-08 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 pro 
forma 
2008 
Revenue 31011 33787 38513 43673 43688 61184 
Net income 2631 3895 3036 3977 3916 5293 
EBIT    6990 6781 9541 
EBITDA    10023 9840 14318 
Net debt 24514 12312 11690 55791 55791 49967 
Employees at 
year end 
61898 51778 58548 73500   
Sources: For 2004-07 http://www.enel.it/azienda/en/investor_relations/dati_sintesi/  For 2007 pro form and 2008 
ENEL, 2009 ‘FY 2008 consolidated result and 09-13 plan’ ENEL. 
Notes 
1. EBIT = Earnings before interest and taxes, EBITDA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. 
These measures were not published in the annual reports prior to 2007 
Table 2 ENEL’s credit rating 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Standard & Poor’s     
Outlook Stable Negative C.W. Negative C.W. Negative 
Medium/long-term A+ A+ A- A- 
Short-term A-1 A-1 A-2 A-2 
Moody’s     
Outlook Stable Stable C.W. Negative C.W. Negative 
Medium/long-term Aa3 Aa3 A1 A2 
Short-term P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1 
Sources: For 2004-07 http://www.enel.it/azienda/en/investor_relations/dati_sintesi/  For 2007 pro form and 2008 
ENEL, 2009 ‘FY 2008 consolidated result and 09-13 plan’ ENEL. 
Evaluating the position of ENEL is complicated by the acquisition of Endesa in October 2007. The 2007 ‘pro 
forma’ figures show the ‘restated’ results i.e. those that would have applied if Endesa had been owned by 
ENEL for the entire year (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
Over the past five years, revenue and net income (profits) have doubled, mostly since 2007 and the 
acquisition of Endesa, which also led to a significant increase in number of employees. However, what is 
most striking from the overall results is the increase in debt, which had been falling for several years up to 
2006, but increased five-fold in 2007. There was a reduction of 10% in net debt in 2008, but levels of debt 
are still far above levels in the past decade. The credit rating has also been falling (see Annex for a 
description of the different categories). For the long-term, both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rate ENEL 
well below their highest ratings and the outlook is for further declines. ENEL’s short-term ability to repay its 
debts is not in doubt but its declining long-term rating will impact adversely on its cost of capital, 
particularly important given ENEL’s high debts and its ambitious nuclear investment plans. 
As a result, its analysis of its 2008 results state9: ‘Maintaining A-/A2 rating is key to deploying our plan’ and 
it aims to reduce net debt to €41bn by 2013. It aims to do this primarily through asset sales (€10bn), a rights 
issue (€8bn) and free cash flow (€4bn). These have to be off-set against the €12bn that will be required to 
finance the buyout of Acciona from Endesa. The asset sales include: 
• Sale of high voltage electricity grid (2009); 
• Sale of majority stake of gas network (2009); 
• Sale of minority stake of ENEL Green Power (2009); and  
• Other non-strategic assets (2009 and 2010). 
The first three sales are expected to raise €6bn, while the non-strategic assets (unspecified) are expected to 
raise €1.6bn in 2009 and €2.4bn in 2010.10 The sale of the high voltage grid (TERNA) is already agreed and 
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will raise €1.15 in April 2009.11 Two separate binding offers for ENEL's low-pressure gas network (out of 12 
companies expressing an interest) have been received, reportedly for about €1.3bn.12 The value of the stake 
in ENEL Green Power that must be sold to make up the €6bn target is, implicitly, €3.5bn. Whether this is 
realistic remains to be seen. 
The rights issue is expected to take place in 2009 and will be underwritten by a group of banks and backed 
by the Italian state, a 31% shareholder, which has agreed to back the rights issue.13 
ENEL is also increasing its free cash flow by abandoning a target of a fixed €0.49 a share in favour of paying 
out 60% of net profits from 2009 onwards. It is reducing its capital expenditure plans by €12bn from its 
previous capital expenditure plans, and will spend €33bn over the next five years.14 
5.2. Divisional breakdown 
Table 3 and Table 4 show ENEL’s results by division. In terms of revenue, the largest division is the ‘Market 
– Italy’ division. However, reflecting that this is a simple retail business, the profits and headcount are low 
and the investment needs are minimal. ‘Generation & energy management – Italy’ is also a high revenue 
business with higher profits and investment (‘capex’) needs than ‘Market – Italy’. ‘Infrastructure & network 
– Italy’ is highly profitable (as measured by EBITDA as a percentage of revenues), but also consumes a high 
proportion of ‘capex’ and employs nearly a third of ENEL’s total workforce. The ‘international’ division 
also employs a large number of employees. The new ‘Iberia & Latam’ division is profitable but employs 
about a quarter of ENEL’s workforce and accounts for nearly 40% of investment needs. The ENEL Green 
Power division appears highly profitable although it does require a large amount of ‘capex’. 
Table 3 ENEL profitability by division (2008) 
 EBITDA as % of Revenue 
Gen & energy management - Italy 14 
Market - Italy 2 
Infrastructure & network - Italy 57 
International 22 
Iberia & Latam 29 
ENEL Green Power 64 
TOTAL 19 
Source: ENEL 2008 Results Annexes 
While the sale of stakes in the high voltage grid, the gas distribution network and ENEL Green Power will 
help reduce the investment requirements, these divisions represent by far the most profitable parts of ENEL 
accounting for only 12% of revenue but 34% of EBITDA. 
5.3. Physical assets 
The acquisition of Endesa has significantly expanded ENEL’s scope so that now more than half of its 
generating capacity and more than two thirds of its production is located outside Italy (see Table 5). 
Table 5 ENEL’s generating capacity 
 Generating capacity (GW) Production (TWh) 
Italy 40.3 96.3 
Iberia 16.7 61.9 
S E Europe 6.4 26.4 
Russia 8.2 22.5 
Americas 11.7 46.1 
Total 83.3 315.9 
Source: ENEL, 2009 ‘Annexes to FY-2008 consolidated results and 09-13 plan’, ENEL
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Table 3  ENEL results by division 
 Revenues €m/% EBITDA €m/% Capex €m/% Headcount 
 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Gen & energy management - Italy 17063 / 32 22143 / 30 2743 / 28 3113 / 22 900 / 19 887 / 14 6931 / 10 6829 / 10 
Market - Italy 22179 / 41 22609 /31 318 / 3 554/ 4 59 / 1 72 / 1 4669 / 7 4170 / 6 
Infrastructure & network - Italy 5457 / 10 6537 / 9 3543 / 36 3719 / 26 1587 / 33 1407 / 22 22710 / 34 20394 / 30 
International 2794 / 5 4708 / 6 766 / 8 1044 / 7 332 / 7 681 / 11 11259 / 17 16865 / 25 
Iberia & Latam 4517 / 8 15805 / 21 1420 / 14 4647 / 33 1255 / 26 2382 / 37 19786 / 29 17827 / 26 
ENEL Green Power 1536  / 3 1852 / 3 989 /10 1188 / 8 663 / 14 951 / 15 2313 / 3 2432 / 4 
TOTAL 53546 / 100 73654 / 100 9779 / 100 14265 /100 4796 /100 6380 / 100 67668 / 100 68517 / 100 
Source: ENEL 2008 Results Annexes 
Notes 
1. Figures for 2007 are ‘pro forma’ 
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6. ENEL’s nuclear aspirations 
6.1. ENEL’s record 
Italy’s record in Italy with nuclear power is very mediocre (see Table 6). ENEL was one of the first utilities 
to enter nuclear power, buying three small demonstration plants, two from the USA and one from UK. The 
reliability of these plants was generally poor. The record of the Latina plant was reasonably good. However, 
the record of both the Garigliano, a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) unit and the Trino Vercellese, a 
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) unit, plants was very variable. The Garigliano plant only operated for 14 
years before it had to be permanently shut down. In the period 1970-78, while the annual load factor 
exceeded 80% in two years, for four years, it was less 35% or less. For the Trino Vercellese plant, in the 
period 1970-86, while in four years, its load factor15 exceeded 85%, in four years it produced no power. 
The one commercial size plant, Caorso, took more than eight years to build and for more than three years 
after its completion, it was in the testing phase producing little power. Its reliability over the next five years 
was mediocre and it closed for repairs in 1986 and did not restart again. All four plants were closed for 
repairs or already permanently shutdown (Garigliano) by the time of the referendum on nuclear power in 
November 1987. 
Table 6 Italy’s nuclear power plants 
 Vendor Net power 
(MW) 
Construction 
start 
Commercial 
operation 
Last 
power 
Average load 
factor (%) 
Latina UK 153 1958 1964 1986 74 
Garigliano GE 150 1959 1964 1978 54 
Trino Vercellese Westinghouse 260 1961 1965 1987 52 
Caorso Ansaldo/GE 860 1970 1981 1986 62 
Source: IAEA PRIS database. http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/  
Note: Load factor is calculated as the actual output of a plant during a year as a percentage of the output it would have 
produced had it operated at full power uninterrupted throughout the year. Load factor is generally seen as a good 
indicator of the reliability of a plant 
The Italian government and thus ENEL had grandiose plans for nuclear expansion, especially after the first 
oil crisis but these came to nothing. A two unit BWR station, Montalto di Castro, was ordered in 1975 but 
construction did not start until 1982 and by 1988, when work was finally abandoned, the units were only 
67% and 42% complete.16 The station was converted to gas-firing. Sites for three stations each comprising 
two PWRs of about 1000MW were designated in 1983 (one of which was the Trino Vercellese site), but little 
in the way of construction came of these plans.17 
In November 1987, a referendum was held on nuclear power. The question was not a simple one of whether 
or not to use nuclear power, it related to whether three specific laws aimed at facilitating nuclear construction 
should be allowed to stand. One law allowed money to be provided to towns that agreed to accommodate 
nuclear plants. The second allowed a small group of Cabinet ministers to decide where plants should be built. 
The third allowed the state energy company, ENEL, to be involved in nuclear power projects abroad. 
All three laws were decisively rejected by a majority of about 4 to 1.18 However, as the questions did not 
explicitly relate to the operation of the two remaining plants (Garigliano had already been closed and Latina 
was permanently closed in 1988) and it was not till July 1990 that it was decided that Trino Vercellese and 
Caorso should be formally closed. 
While the four plants that operated have been defuelled, little progress has been made with decommissioning 
them. The plants are in ‘safestore’, awaiting dismantlement of the contaminated structures. By end 2007, 
Sogin, the company (100% owned by the Italian Treasury) whose duty it is to decommission the plants 
claimed only 7% of decommissioning had been completed but that it expected to complete 51% of the job by 
2012.19 
In December 1987, the Italian government imposed a 5-year ban on planning and construction of new 
nuclear units.20 When the moratorium expired, there was pressure, more symbolic than serious, from some 
quarters to re-open Trino Vercellese and Caorso.21 Under the moratorium, ENEL was allowed to continue to 
carry out R&D on inherently safe designs. However, while there were continual calls from some quarters for 
the moratorium to be lifted, it was not under serious question until January 2005 when Prime Minister 
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Berlusconi suggested Italy should reconsider the de facto ban on nuclear power22 and in 2008, the Berlusconi 
government made construction of nuclear plants a ‘priority’.23 
By 2005, ENEL had already committed to complete two part-built nuclear plants of Russian design 
(Mochovce 3 and 4) as a condition for its takeover of the Slovak generation company, Slovenske Elektrarne, 
and it had also made agreements with EDF on participation in construction of nuclear plants in France. 
ENEL hoped that these projects would help it re-build its nuclear expertise so that construction could start on 
its first new nuclear unit in 2013 and by 2030, 25% of Italy’s electricity would come from nuclear power. 
6.2. Italy 
ENEL has never made any secret of its wish to restart a nuclear programme in Italy and the announcement 
by Berlusconi in 2008 gave them the green light to start to develop plans. In February 2009, at the same time 
as ENEL took a 12.5% stake in the Penly EPR (see below), EDF announced a 50/50 joint venture with 
ENEL to build four EPRs in Italy. The EDF-ENEL agreements coincided with the signing of a nuclear 
cooperation agreement in Rome between President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Berlusconi. The agreement 
is still very much a preliminary one that will last for five years, when it could be renewed. Final choice of 
technology has not been made yet and the plans are dependent on changes being made to Italian law.24 
6.3. France 
ENEL’s largest potential nuclear investment outside Italy is in France, where it has been working with EDF 
on the construction of new nuclear plants in France since 2003. It had tried to take a stake in a small French 
generation company, SNET, which Endesa also had a share in but these holdings were passed to E.ON as 
part of the deal under which E.ON withdrew their bid for Endesa. For most of 2004, a deal with EDF was 
said to be imminent but it was not till May 2005 that the deal was finally agreed.25 Under the deal, ENEL 
would take 200MW (12.5%) from each of the first five EPRs built in France. Construction on the first unit, 
Flamanville 3, started in December 2007. Because power from Flamanville-3 was not expected to be 
available before 2012, ENEL will be given access to the equivalent of that 12.5% stake in six reactors, or 
about 1,200 MW, from EDF's existing nuclear plant fleet.26 ENEL will pay 12.5% of the cost of Flamanville-
3 and will participate in the top-level engineering and construction project, to gain experience for future 
nuclear projects of its own. Conclusion of the deal was delayed until November 2007.27 
In July 2008, President Sarkozy announced that a new EPR would be ordered for construction start in 2011.28 
EDF would build the next EPR in France rather than GDF Suez (who would build the third EPR) and it 
would be built at the Penly site (two PWRs are already in service at that site). A number of possible 
additional investors as well as ENEL, which is entitled to take 12.5% of the project under the 2007 
agreement, have been mooted including E.ON29 but this has subsequently been denied.30 In February 2009, 
ENEL and EDF announced an ‘industrial agreement’ for ENEL to take up a 12.5% stake in Penly.31 
The 2007 EDF Annual Report states: 
“On November 30, 2007, EDF and ENEL signed a strategic partnership agreement, under which ENEL bears a 
12.5% share in all construction, operation, decommissioning and back-end nuclear cycle management expenses for 
the Flamanville 3 EPR-type nuclear plant, in return for access to 12.5% of the electricity generated by the EPR over 
its lifetime. The plant’s nuclear operator is EDF, which bears full responsibility for its operations. The partnership 
agreement also gives ENEL the option of progressively acquiring the electricity generated by EDF’s nuclear plants, 
up to a total capacity of 1,200 MW.”32 
And: 
“ENEL also has an option, until 2023, to take a 12.5% stake under similar terms in the five potential EPR projects 
likely to be implemented by EDF in France up to that date.”33 
In November 2008, EDF did acknowledge that the expected construction costs for Flamanville had increased 
from €3.3 billion to €4 billion.34 However, for future EPRs, EDF estimated in September 2008 that the cost 
would be €4.5bn35. 
6.4. The take-over of Slovenske Elektrarne and the Mochovce plant 
ENEL agreed to buy 66% of the Slovak utility Slovenske Elektrarne (SE) in February 2005 for €840m. The 
deal was completed in May 2006. ENEL’s main competition came, not as for many other utilities in the 
region, from the giant West European utilities such as EDF and RWE, but from the Czech company CEZ and 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
21/04/2009  Page 11 of 18  
  
the Russian company RAO UES. SE then operated about 7,000 MW of capacity (83% of the total in 
Slovakia), including six reactors of the Russian design, WWER-440, at the Bohunice (four units) and 
Mochovce (two units) sites. As a condition of the deal, ENEL said it would continue SE’s plan to complete 
two more reactors at Mochovce, where two recently completed WWER-440s are operating.36 However, it 
was reported in the Slovak press that completion of Mochovce was not part of the formal deal and that 
completion would only take place if found possible after a feasibility study.37 
In May 2008, Greenpeace lodged a complaint with the European Commission that SE had received illegal 
state aid in the takeover by ENEL because SE had shifted some of the future decommissioning liability for 
Mochovce-3 and -4 and the existing liability of SE's other reactors to the national budget.38 
The first two units at the Bohunice site, which were of a generation WWER-400 design, the ‘230’ design, 
were excluded from the deal, as was a gas-cooled reactor that was closed in the 1977 following a severe 
accident. The two WWER-440 units at the Bohunice site were permanently closed in 2006 and 2008 
respectively. 
The four Mochovce units are second-generation WWER-440 plants of the ‘213 design’. Construction began 
in 1983 but was suspended in the country's transition from a planned to a market economy in the early 1990s. 
Units 1 and 2 were then reported to be 90% and 75% complete respectively. Work on the first two units 
recommenced in 1995 led by a consortium of Siemens, Framatome and Czech and Slovak companies and the 
units entered commercial operation in 1998 and 1999. 
The cost of completing the plants is not known but the fact that it took 3-4 years to finish plants that were 
said to be already 75-90% complete suggests the process was far from smooth. The reliability of the plants 
has been about typical for that of WWER-440 units with the average life-time load factor for the two units, a 
little under 80%.39 
The third and fourth units were reported to be only 40% and 30% complete when work was halted on them. 
When ENEL took over SE the forecast completion date for the reactors was 2011-12. ENEL was expected to 
finalise a feasibility study in April 2007 and then take a final decision whether or not it would invest in the 
units. 
The result of the feasibility study was positive but the timescale to complete Mochovce 3 and 4 quickly 
slipped. By 2007, the expected completion date was 2012-1340 when the contracts for completion were 
expected to be signed in mid-2008. Obtaining finance became a problem. In 2007, a consortium of nine 
banks41 agreed to provide ENEL/SE with a €800m ‘revolving credit’ facility over seven years. However, in 
2008, under pressure from Greenpeace, three banks, ING, Banca Intesa and Erste Bank, refused to allow the 
credit facility to be used for the completion of Mochovce, then projected to cost €1.7bn. ENEL/SE was 
forced to issue a statement that it would finance completion of the plants from internally generated cash.42 
The European Commission also became concerned in May 2008 that the designs were not adequately safe.43 
However, in July 2008, it ruled that ENEL/SE’s plans: ‘were "in line with the objectives of the Euratom 
Treaty," provided the utility "bring(s) the design in line with the existing best practices" concerning 
protection against external attack.’44 
The process was further delayed in September 2008 by a Slovak government decision to require ENEL/SE 
complete a new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).45 Signing of the contract to complete the plants 
was still being delayed. Nucleonics Week reported in October 2008 that the price for completion being 
offered by Skoda and Atomstroyexport had tripled and that they were unwilling to sign up to ‘turnkey 
terms’.46 Nevertheless, site work was started, perhaps due to the threat that the Slovak government had been 
prepared to expropriate ENEL’s 66-percent stake in power producer SE if it had not commenced completion 
of Mochovce.47 
In November 2009, the contract price was reported to be €2.775bn, but ENEL/SE was still claiming it would 
finance the project from cash-flow.48 Significantly, Skoda had been replaced as overall project manager by 
ENEL. By March 2009, the contract was still not signed.49 
A further threat to the Mochovce project came with the decision to reduce the market dominance of SE in 
Slovakia. In December 2008, the Slovak government announced a joint venture agreement between CEZ, the 
Czech electric utility that had tried to buy SE, and a Slovak government owned utility, Javys, which operates 
the Bohunice plants. Under the joint venture, a new nuclear plant would be built at the Bohunice site, 
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expected to come on-line in 2020.50 If built, this would leave Slovakia with a surplus of base-load power and 
this could force down the price ENEL/SE would receive for the output of Mochovce 3 and 4. It remains to be 
seen whether the CEZ/Javys joint venture is a serious proposition. 
6.5. Romania 
ENEL controls two energy distribution companies in Romania with 51% of the shares, Electrica Banat and 
Electrica Dobrogea, with 1.4 m customers. This makes it the biggest foreign operator in the Romanian 
electricity distribution sector, with a market share of around 30%. However, in 2008, it began to bid for 
involvement in the construction of two new nuclear plants at the Cernavoda site. The site has an even longer 
history than Mochovce. A deal was originally signed in 1978 for supply by the Canadian vendor, AECL, of 
five reactors. The plants were of the Canadian ‘Candu’ design, which is a heavy water cooled and moderated 
design. The actual orders were delayed and problems of finance slowed work on the units from the start. The 
first unit was finally completed in 1996, by which time, unit 2 was only 25% complete and construction had 
been halted. Work restarted on unit 2 and the plant was completed in October 2007. For units 3-5, civil work 
has been carried out but no equipment has been purchased yet. In mid-2006 a scoping study for the 
Environmental Impact Assessment was issued for the completion of units 3 and 4. 
The plants are owned by a state-owned utility, Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica, which in November 
2008 set up a new company, S.C. EnergoNuclear S.A., in which it is the majority shareholder with 51%. The 
other shareholders are ENEL, CEZ, GDF Suez and RWE, each with 9.15%, and Iberdrola and ArcelorMittal 
Galati, both with 6.2%. The new company will be responsible for the construction, commissioning and 
operation of the two new units.51 In March 2009, construction was expected to start at the beginning of 2010 
and the plants are expected to be in service in 2015 at a cost of about €4bn.52 It remains to be seen whether 
these targets will be met or whether delays will continue. The two new units will use the AECL Candu-6 
design, which was first ordered more than 30 years ago, the most recent order being for two units for China, 
ordered in 1996. AECL is now offering an ‘enhanced’ Candu-6 which has not yet been ordered and it may be 
that the new Cernavoda units will use this design. 
7. Scale and risks of ENEL’s nuclear plans 
7.1. Investment scale 
It is difficult to estimate the timing and extent of ENEL’s investment requirements given the notorious 
tendency for nuclear costs to escalate and for target dates to be missed. 
7.1.1. France 
Perhaps the most likely plans to be fulfilled are those of EDF in France. ENEL has an option to take 12.5% 
of 6 EPRs built by EDF. EDF estimated in November 2008 that the Flamanville EPR would cost €4bn. The 
exact details of the agreement between ENEL and EDF are not known, but the text in the EDF annual report 
(see section 6.3) strongly suggests that ENEL will have to pay 12.5% of the actual cost, not the forecast cost. 
It will also have to pay 12.5% of the operation, decommissioning and back-end nuclear cycle management 
expenses. These costs will only be incurred after the plant starts up and ENEL would expect they can be 
recovered from the proceeds of sale of electricity. If these costs are higher than expected and cannot be 
recovered from the sale of electricity, this will be an additional burden on ENEL. 
The construction cost has already escalated by more than 20% to €4bn and experience suggests that risk of 
more cost escalation is significant. If there is no further cost escalation, ENEL’s share would be €0.5bn. 
EDF has acknowledged that subsequent EPRs would cost at least €4.5bn. 53 While the location (Penly) and 
the estimated construction start (2011) of the next French EPR that EDF is to build, the timing of the 
following four units is far from clear. The need for any new nuclear plants to be ordered in France is far from 
clear54, but if we assume the plants are ordered and they cost no more than €4.5bn, that implies an investment 
need for the next five plants of a further €2.8bn. There is also, as with Flamanville the risk associated with 
higher than expected operating, decommissioning and waste disposal costs. The total investment cost for 
France would be at least €3.3bn 
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7.1.2. Slovakia 
The completion of the Mochovce plants (units 3 and 4) is problematic from a number of perspectives. 
Experience of completing part-built units in Czech Republic (Temelin) and Ukraine (Khmelnitsky 3 and 
Rovno 4) has been fraught with difficulties. In particular, bringing orders placed 20 or more years ago up to 
current safety standards has proved difficult. There is also the quality of the work that has been done so far 
which is frequently not well documented.55 Mochovce 3 and 4 are reported to be only 30-40% complete so 
this does allow more scope for changing technology. However, this begs the question, if Mochovce 3 and 4 
are effectively new build, how can it be acceptable to be using what is essentially 1960s technology? The 
suspicion must be that using modern technology with state-of-the-art safety would be far more expensive.  
If they really are ‘completions’ then this exposes ENEL to the risks that were apparent in the completion of 
Temelin, Mochovce, Khmelnitsky and Rovno. The Slovak investment was estimated in November 2009 to 
be €2.775bn, but this figure increased by more than 60% between 2007 and end-2008 and experience at 
Temelin and elsewhere suggests there will be more cost escalation. Construction did formally commence in 
November 2008, but this seemed more symbolic than and the contract for the plant’s construction had not 
been signed by March 2009. 
7.1.3. Romania 
Construction of the two Candu units in the Romanian programme is expected to start in 2010 at a total cost 
of €4bn, of which ENEL is expected to take 9.15% or €370m. The timing and extent of the expenditure 
remains highly uncertain. 
7.1.4. Italy 
The largest potential investment in nuclear comes in the Italian market itself, where ENEL plans to build 
four units, in collaboration with EDF, which will share the costs of the feasibility studies. It is not clear 
whether the agreement places EDF under any obligation to invest in plants in Italy: the agreement with 
ENEL is reported to require that ENEL is only the majority owner.56 Given that EDF’s levels of debt are 
already higher than it wants and it expects to have to sell some assets to reduce this57 and it also expects to 
have to finance nuclear investments in France and the UK, it seems unlikely that EDF will want more than a 
small share if any. 
If we assume that ENEL has to finance all four units but that they can be built for no more than the forecast 
cost of French EPRs, €4.5bn, this would require an investment of €18bn. Even if the figure of €4.5bn for 
EPRs does apply in France, it seems highly unlikely that this figure could be matched in Italy given ENEL’s 
lack of experience for more than 20 years in building nuclear plants. E.ON, the largest German electric 
utility estimated in 2008 that the cost of building an EPR in the UK would be €6bn58. Estimates for US plants 
are now in the order US$5000-8000/kW. At an exchange rate of €1=US$1.33, and if we assume the capacity 
of an EPR is 1700MW, this implies a cost per unit of €6.4-10.0bn. If we assume E.ON’s estimate for 
building an EPR in the UK would be realistic for Italy, this suggests the cost of four units would be about 
€25bn. The first plant is expected to be in service by 2020, implying a construction start in 2014/15. It is not 
clear when the follow-up orders would be placed. 
7.1.5. Total 
If we add together the four nuclear programmes, France €3.3bn, Slovakia €2.8bn, Romania €0.4bn and Italy 
€25bn, the total investment comes to about €31.5bn. All historic experience suggests there is ample scope for 
costs to escalate. 
8. Conclusions 
The purchase by ENEL of Endesa for more than €40bn was the major factor between an increase in ENEL’s 
net debt from about €10bn in 2006 to the current level of about €50bn. Whether the acquisition of Endesa 
will be a good strategic move remains to be seen, but the deal is done and ENEL now has to cope with the 
consequences, especially in a high level of debt. It is worth noting in this context that EDF, which has a 
turnover of about the same level as ENEL is concerned about its level of debt despite it being only €25bn, 
half that of ENEL. 
The need to buy out ENEL’s minority partner in Spain, Acciona, will require a further €11bn, although this 
will be offset by already committed sales of stakes in the high voltage electricity network (€1.15bn) and the 
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gas distribution network (about €1.3bn). To reduce debt to the target level of about €40bn, ENEL is planning 
to: sell other assets (about €8bn), including a stake ENEL Green Energy (implicitly about €3.5bn); raise 
€8bn from a rights issue; and contribute €4bn from cash flow. As the Italian government still owns 31% of 
ENEL, Italian taxpayers will pay for about €2.5bn of the rights issue. 
Of course, if the priority is raising money, the assets that will raise most are the most profitable ones and 
Table 4 shows that the assets ENEL wants to sell are by far its most profitable ones. The profitability of 
‘ENEL Green Power’ and the ‘Infrastructure and Network Italy’ division is three times that of the group as a 
whole. 
Reducing ENEL’s debt to manageable levels will therefore be extremely challenging. This makes it all the 
more surprising that ENEL should be contemplating major and economically risky investments costing in the 
order €30bn over the next decade. These investments appear almost entirely discretionary. 
The deal with EDF is only an option, not an obligation, to take 12.5% of up to six new EPRs built by EDF 
(3000MW). This would effectively replace the capacity ENEL has given up in France in the past few years 
but would still leave it as a very small player in France compared to EDF and the newly formed GDF Suez 
group. It seems unlikely that acquiring these stakes would lead to a significant business in France. 
The Slovak press has reported that completion of Mochovce was not part of the formal deal to take over SE 
and that completion would only take place if found possible after a feasibility study. Given that the price for 
completion had tripled, this would surely have been ample grounds to argue that the risk that the completed 
plants would be uneconomic was far too high to proceed. Whether ENEL is now irrevocably committed to 
the completion is far from clear. Construction work has been reported to have been resumed but since 
contracts do not appear to have been signed, it should be a priority now to establish whether ENEL’s position 
is really irreversible. 
The investment in the Romanian plant, while relatively small, is also entirely optional and its main purpose 
seems to be to contribute to re-building ENEL’s nuclear capability. 
However, by far the largest planned investment is in Italy itself and is probably of the order €25bn alone. 
ENEL’s historic record with nuclear plants is poor. Plants have been unreliable, and costs and lead-times 
have far exceeded forecast levels. While a poor record does not condemn ENEL to always fail, it does 
illustrate the risks. ENEL may claim to have learnt from its past failings but it has had little experience with 
nuclear for more than two decades, so it is effectively starting from scratch. Whether Italy needs additional 
generating capacity is a moot point. It clearly needs to replace some of its fossil fuel capacity with low-
carbon sources. While nuclear power is a low carbon-source, it does bring with it other environmental issues 
that other low carbon sources, such as wind, solar, biomass etc and, most important of all, energy efficiency 
measures do not bring. 
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9. Annex Credit Ratings 
9.1. Standard & Poor’s 
Standard and Poor’s long term (i.e., more than a year forward) ratings are, in descending order of credit-
worthiness: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C and D (default). All of these except D can be modified 
up by a ‘+’ sign or down by a ‘-’ sign. According to Standard & Poor’s:59 
‘An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and 
economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its 
financial commitment on the obligation is still strong.’ 
Standard & Poor’s short-term ratings are, in descending order of credit-worthiness: A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, 
B-3, C, and D (default). Standard & Poor’s states: 
‘A short-term obligation rated 'A-1' is rated in the highest category by Standard & Poor's. The obligor's capacity to 
meet its financial commitment on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated 
with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on these obligations 
is extremely strong.’ 
While: 
‘A short-term obligation rated 'A-2' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances 
and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its 
financial commitment on the obligation is satisfactory.’ 
‘Outlook ratings’ can be either ‘stable’, ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ a Credit Watch (C.W.) qualification ‘focuses 
on identifiable events and short-term trends that cause ratings to be placed under special surveillance by 
Standard & Poor's analytical staff.’ 
9.2. Moody’s 
Moody’s long-term ratings fall into two main bands, ‘investment grade’ or ‘speculative grade’ (also known 
as high yield or junk). Within ‘investment grade, there ten subdivisions: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, 
Baa1, Baa2 and Baa3. Moody’s states:60 
‘Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk, but "their susceptibility 
to long-term risks appears somewhat greater [than Aaa]".’ 
While 
‘Obligations rated ‘A’ are considered upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk, but that have elements 
"present that suggest a susceptibility to impairment over the long term".’ 
Its short term ratings are P-1, P-2, and P-3, with P-1: ‘Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-1 ‘have 
a superior ability to repay short-term debt for the obligations.’ Its ‘outlook’ ratings are as for Standard & 
Poor’s. 
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